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Introduction
The transformation of Times Square is a story of complexity and consequence ripe for the telling on
several levels. As a physical transformation, the twenty-year saga begins in the early 1980s with the
city’s dual-sided policy initiatives to dramatically rezone midtown Manhattan and aggressively redevelop
West 42nd Street through a public coalition of city and state public entities. As a social transformation,
the public-development project promised to clear away the depraved social pathology of the place—the
“bad” uses—and put in place “good” uses: new commercial activity at either end of the block and
renovated historic theaters for Broadway fare in the midblock. As a cultural transformation, commercial
activities attractive to the middle class would replace the sex-and-drug bazaar that had earned the street a
worldwide reputation for decades. From its very beginning, the redevelopment intentions for West 42nd
Street and Times Square grabbed center stage as a high-profile initiative of central importance to elected
officials, reflective in both real and symbolic terms of the city’s agenda to rebuild itself, economically as
well as physically, after a crushing fiscal crisis. By the end of the decade, the effort was at a stalemate,
bogged down by litigation and entrapped in a real estate downturn. By the mid-1990s, economic and
social forces had recast the long-running pessimistic prognosis for the project. As activity on the street
shifted from drug dealing, prostitution, and pornography to legitimate theater, family entertainment,
tourism, and office employment, ironies of change defined the transformation. As seen from afar, the

* Drawn from Lynne B. Sagalyn, Times Square Roulette: Remaking the City Icon MIT Press, November 2001.

transformation signaled not merely a new 42nd Street, but redemption of New York’s image as a “big,
bad city.”
Nothing really went according to plan, for either public officials or private developers. Rather, a
complex relationship between planning and politics recast the initial intentions of the 42nd Street
Development Project (42DP) and in interaction with market forces altered the course of revitalization in
Times Square. Symbolism too became a mediating force among contending, fractious interests in shaping
the fabric of the place. From its beginning as Longacre (also known as Long Acre) Square, Times
Square quickly evolved into an icon as the place’s symbolic associations—garish commercialism,
spectacular signage, cultural diversity, and social tolerance—embedded themselves deep into the city’s
psyche. More than the city’s center for entertainment, more than a commercial marketplace capable of
satisfying diverse consumer needs, Times Square has been a public place of high symbolic importance. Its
symbolic role guaranteed that any plan for its renewal would arouse fierce debate and fractious opposition
from a range of interests. It would push the hot buttons of public controversy: free speech, propertytaking through eminent domain, development density, tax subsidy, and historic preservation. It was
contested turf.
Throughout the twenty-year development period, symbolism was used by all of the drama’s
players to shape the debate and promote alternative visions of what the new 42nd Street should be. For
the project’s promoters, it served as a rationale for advancing a large-scale development strategy
predicated on condemnation, a cleanup designed to return the street to its former legendary glory.
Promising that the midblock historic theaters would be preserved, city officials used symbolism as
political leverage to build a coalition of support among preservationists, culturally-minded civic groups,
and performing artists. Developers too, fearing a return to the days of porn, evoked symbolic as well as
real images of the past as an argument against allowing movies on the street. The argument against
demolition of the architecturally defaced former Times Tower rested solely on symbolism: It was revered
not as architecture, but as an irreplaceable icon of the place, of New York. Civic groups in pushing forth
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their agenda for strong urban-design controls in Times Square vociferously argued in terms calculated to
evoke symbolic meaning: Don’t let corporate culture dull and dim the Great White Way. And finally, the
project’s planners evoked the razzle-dazzle visual images of the Great White Way to promote 42nd Street
Now!
Drawing on the complete story of the transformation in Times Square Roulette: Remaking the
City Icon, this paper focuses on the role of symbolism, as historic legacy, in mediating change in this
most public of public places. It begins with description of Times Square’s five meanings of place and
then explains the central role of symbolism in several key episodes of the transformation of West 42nd
Street, from initial plans to final blueprint. The historic but darkened theaters, mutilated but beloved
former Times Tower, and legacy of commercialism and glitz signs each weighed in as tangible and
powerful arguments for rebuilding in ways that would be consistent with the symbolic legacy of the
district’s past. That success bequeathed one of the transformation’s most meaningful lessons of renewal.

Symbolic Soul of the City
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s the unvarnished and unromantic truth about Times Square contrasted
sharply with the historic image and myth about the place. It was no longer the nation’s central production
center for popular entertainment, yet it remained its preeminent icon and symbol of show business. It was
no longer the city’s creative core or its trend-setting scene, yet it remained its symbol of “golden
potential” and a “testing ground of the limits of fantasy and fulfillment.” It was no longer coining
revolutionary vernacular speech, yet the place maintained its hold on the mental imagination of tourists
and city dwellers alike. Even when the energy crisis dimmed the dramatic displays and bright lights of
the district in the early 1970s, the legendary vision of spectaculars continued to shine brightly in the
minds and imaginations of those who visualized the past. Even in civic disgrace and criminal distress
when in 1981, West 42nd Street was billed by Rolling Stone magazine as “the sleaziest block in America”
and identified in the national press with the general woes of New York, the “local” nature of the place
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continued to be eclipsed by its larger role as a powerful national metaphor, this time, however, for urban
pathology and decline. Hopeful words attached themselves to negative realities: “gloriously vulgar,”
“decedent raffishness,” “seedy grandeur,” “tawdry glamour,” “a junkyard for dreams.” The Great White
Way might now be “a byword for ostentatious flesh-peddling in an open-air meat rack,” but it was still
the “crossroads of the world.”1 The illustrious memory of success was not to be erased.
One did not have to look too far for an explanation of this paradox. For New Yorkers, West 42nd
Street and Times Square had become synonymous with the city itself, its commercialism, intense energy,
urban insouciance, and cultural and economic diversity—a constantly changing stage for urban life.
Writers sharpened their pencils when evoking the romance and importance of the place, especially in the
1980s when all seemed threatened by the city and state’s redevelopment plan which most critics
disfavored intensely: Times Square, they said, was “a bubbling up of human nature. Its chronometer is on
perpetual Night Saving Time”; “A giant blinking toy, an entertainment in itself”; “The most fragile kind
of urban fabric, in a constant state of change”; “The most dynamic and intense urban space of the 20th
century, America’s gift to the modern world, a home for magic realism, the commercial sublime”; “Times
Square is not just a place, it’s a backdrop, a colorful, ironic setting that symbolizes the round-the-clock
vibrancy of New York City.”2
In short, Times Square served as the symbolic soul of New York. Its chaotic action, dense and
diverse pedestrian activity, continuous role as the key entertainment district—in a city defined by creative
juices—immutable prime location as the city’s transit hub, and unique physical “experience of place”
which derived from its small-scale buildings, open space, and illuminated lights made it a public place
over-endowed with meaning, or as the cultural commentators saw it, drenched in semiotic meaning.
Times Square was a stage for urban life to one group, a state of mind to another, and a danger zone to still
another. Its seediness was considered integral to New York.
Symbolic meanings of place took center stage in the campaign to garner support for the city’s
aggressive plans for redevelopment. Symbolic rhetoric dominated the many sets of public hearings on the
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42DP during the 1980s. The depth of symbolic significance underscored the objections of civic groups,
architectural critics, and cultural commentators who later made strong appeals to preserve Times Square’s
values, past and present, which they believed were being cast aside in the pursuit of a comprehensive
cleanup that would use “good” activities—offices, hotels, restaurants, theaters—to drive out the “bad”—
drug dealing, prostitution, vagrancy, and homeless congregations—of West 42nd Street. And as
controversy and complexity continuously spawned lawsuits and produced years of delays throughout the
decade, the symbolism of the place grew ever more sophisticated and elaborate.
Meaning permeates a city incrementally. Over time, out of the special ness of memorable events
as well as the commonality of daily experiences, an overlay of meanings accumulates. It maps the
evocative content of place from a generalized perspective, though casts, shadows, and weights of meaning
differ across groups of city residents. At least five meanings fashioned the symbolism of place of Times
Square for New Yorkers.
First, as “The Theater District,” Times Square laid claim to exceedingly proud history renown
throughout the world. Embodied in a tradition of legitimate theater which in its time represented the
leading edge of show business, this story glorified a type of urban energy characterized by the city’s own
special ethnic “moxie.”
Second, as “The Turf of Promoters and Showmen,” Times Square lay claim to the nation’s first
great “entrepreneurs of entertainment”—Oscar Hammerstein I, David Belasco, Florenz Ziegfeld, Samuel
“Roxy” Rothafel, Irving Berlin, Damon Runyon, the Minsky Brothers, Billy Rose. Legends as largerthan-life showmen, they left an enviable legacy of “financial shrewdness with a remarkable sensitivity to
new markets and changing public tastes,”3 a general point of business pride whose currency has never lost
value among the city’s immigrants or its movers and shakers.
Third, as “The Great White Way,” Times Square lay claim to having invented the “commercial
aesthetic”—bright carnivalesque signs of color, light, and glass designed to thrill, excite, and awe
onlookers while convincing them to buy. Visually, the commercial aesthetic came to define and dominate
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not only Times Square but also much of American culture in a way few cities in the world could match.
Through the medium of promotion, it created super-sized evocative images of desire on billboards and
brilliantly lit “spectaculars,” and these reinforced the city’s own sense of self-importance—that it was
setting time for the nation, that Times Square was an index of cultural changes taking place in real time.
Fourth, as “The Testing Ground,” Times Square laid claim to being a place without limits where
“anything goes.” This was rooted in the historically close association between theater and vice, but the
tales of deviant excesses on West 42nd Street during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s bequeathed an
especially distinctive legacy of sexual theater. It was theater that continually tested the limits of social
tolerance, even that of New Yorkers who habitually exhibit a liberal, if ambivalent, social tolerance—part
pure disgust, part hardened acceptance, part perverse pride: “I can handle anything; there isn’t anything I
haven’t seen in this city; nothing is newly shocking.” Indeed, as Ada Louise Huxtable wrote in her
sharply critical essay “Re-inventing Times Square: 1990,” the city requires a “testing ground of limits,” a
place dealing with fantasy and fulfillment, and this has been Times Square’s unique societal and urban
role. Speaking about architecture with words whose meaning extended beyond the tangibility of bricks
and mortar she said: “When conventional sources [of eclecticism] have been rung dry, the door is opened
to no-style and free-style, to increasingly hyped effects, and to the shock value of those things usually
considered taboo.”4 Life in Times Square was prescient, she implied, for by the 1950s and 1960s, a
similar testing was taking place in society at large. This was no less true in the 1970s and 1980s when an
unbridled market created a unique drugs-and-sex half-world which, when threatened with extinction by
the public’s power of condemnation, acquired a new-found mythic status in what would be irrevocably
lost.
Finally, as “Quintessential New York,” Times Square provided a city image for the nation at
large. That image took shape from the experience of being in Times Square and sampling its particular
brand of city life—going to theater, joining the crowds, vicariously partaking of Broadway’s success.
Constant promotion made it part of the national mythology. While the reality of Times Square was
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changing, especially after the 1930s, Hollywood defined Broadway for America and kept alive the aura of
its old image. As cast on the west coast, Broadway meant the musical—“production numbers of dazzling,
almost surreal beauty,” and “an enchanted place where talent and hard work could lead to undreamed-of
success.”5 The list of “Broadway” movies is long and includes among others: Broadway Melody of 1929
(with later editions in 1938 and 1940), Glorifying The American Girl (1929), 42nd Street (1933), Dames
(1934), The Great Ziegfeld (1936), Stage Door (1937), Babes on Broadway (1942), Footlight Serenade
(1942), Broadway Rhythm (1943), The Band Wagon (1953), Main Street to Broadway (1953), Guys and
Dolls (1955), Sweet Smell of Success (1957), The Producers (1968), Funny Girl (1968), All That Jazz
(1979), Fame (1980), Staying Alive (1983), The Muppets Take Manhattan (1984), Breakin’ (1984), and A
Chorus Line (1985).
This image of Times Square from the glory days of the 1920s was important symbolically, even if
it was out of date, for this was also the highpoint of urban growth in America, when cities all over the
country boasted of their progressive achievements in architecture, engineering, culture, and community.
It was also a time when being in public, especially in Times Square, and being a part of the mixed
crowd—not as just a spectator but simultaneously as a participant—symbolized the ultimate city
experience for visitors and residents alike. Cities glowed in “the spectacle of urban life” in a way that
they have sought to recapture ever since.
Cleaning up West 42nd Street, and by extension Times Square, promised to put the shine back on
the “big apple,” the city’s universally known booster nickname.6 The historic legacy of Times Square
should have made entertainment the obvious planning priority of redevelopment because the area’s
intrinsic character, still evident beneath the sleaze, did not have to be invented, as had been the
monumental task with the creation of Lincoln Center. It was already in place. It was known worldwide.
Yet even had that been the city and state’s initial planning agenda, the stage for controversy was set. The
heavy multifaceted symbolism of Times Square, forged over an extended period of more than 60 years,
was embedded with sensitive associations that touched an especially broad range of interests; it was a
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heavy political load for any redevelopment plan. The politics of the 42nd Street Development Project
would be symbolic politics. What other scenario could possibly prevail?

The Foundation of Political Compromise
The “revitalization of 42nd Street as a theater and entertainment center” featured front and center in all of
the earliest planning documents for the redevelopment project. While economic pragmatism might mean
bending to the commercial profit motive of large-scale office development to pay the bill for cleaning up
the street, city and state officials consistently argued that the task was being undertaken in service of the
bigger goal: “to strengthen the existing theater district and provide a strong anchor for it along 42nd
Street.” The General Project Plan (GPP) noted the neglected heritage of the street’s great theaters with
their “breathtaking architectural details” hidden by movie marquees that had been added in the 1930s, and
explained the desire of the Urban Development Corporation (UDC), the powerful state that had taken on
the role of lead agency for the project, and the city “to seize the opportunity presented by this
concentration of theaters to restore as many theaters as possible.”7 In brief prose the 1981 the Request for
Proposals (RFP) similarly made the case: “a concentration of legitimate theater uses within the Project
Area is possible and necessary to achieve the Project’s goals.” The words “possible and necessary”
represented a telling combination of official encouragement and formal requirement for doing something
extraordinarily difficult. The combination also signaled a weak beginning.
The importance of theater preservation was a political given: After withstanding the political heat
surrounding the loss of the Helen Hayes and Morosco Theaters, Mayor Edward I. Koch and city officials
did not want a second bruising theater battle. “We had to preserve everything,” said Paul Travis, project
manager for the city’s entrepreneurial agent, the Public Development Corporation (PDC).8 Though not
formally designated as architectural landmarks, save for the New Amsterdam Theater which by 1982 had
been designated as a New York landmark and placed on the National Register of Historic Places, the
42nd-Street theaters were considered to be of landmark quality, worthy of preservation. Quality
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restoration was deemed as important as preservation, so working with historians recommended by the
Landmarks Preservation Commission (LPC), the project’s planners developed design guidelines for
interiors and exteriors of the street’s nine theaters. If a full restoration of the theaters was not feasible, the
RFP explained, the project’s design guidelines had built in flexibility by permitting that “some of the
existing theaters be restored and operated as commercial legitimate theaters and others be devoted to
quality entertainment uses, such as multi-media, institutional theater or film.”9
Nevertheless, throughout the 1980s, the task of recreating the street’s historic entertainment focus
presented a daunting programmatic and economic challenge. The decade would turn out to be one of the
worst for the theater industry, with business conditions on a downward slide following the peak 1980-81
season. “Urban entertainment,” the concept that clusters of activity devoted to middle-class recreation
could flourish in cities, had yet to see its moniker in lights. And movie uses—widely associated with
what had made the street a mess—were not allowed long term under the terms of the theater deals
approved by the city’s Board of Estimate (BOE);10 the RFP did not prohibit “film” uses per se, but the big
fear, pushed mainly by private developers, was that movie theaters would turn West 42nd Street back to
pornography. These factors—in short hand, poor timing—conspired against the success of a marketdriven commercial strategy for theater preservation. Relying upon private developers to fill out this
portion of the plan could not possibly alter that reality.
From the start, the theater sites [see Figure 1] struggled for attention. With no specially designed
incentives to attract prospective bidders, it is hard to understand how public officials expected this
difficult piece of the project to move forward. For three years city and state officials failed to attract
prospective developers for Site 5, home of the Lyric, Selwyn, Apollo, Times Square and Victory
Theaters, and only in the month before the public hearing on the Final Environment Impact Statement
(FEIS) did they conditionally designate a developer/operator, Cambridge Investment Group, Ltd., headed
by public-servant-turned-real estate developer, Michael J. Lazar. Lazar’s designation, the last of those
made on the project, came only after city and state officials insisted that because of his lack of experience
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with theater operations he find an established theater company to run the houses, which he did in
Jujamcyn Company, a major New York theater operator. Then, less than twenty months later, when he
was indicted on charges of racketeering and mail fraud stemming from a major scandal at the city’s
Parking Violations Bureau, the city and state revoked this conditional designation. Designation of a
developer for the Site 5 theaters remained suspended in a void for four years, until 1990, when a newly
created non-profit, the 42nd Street Entertainment Corporation (42EC) took over the theater agenda for the
42DP.
Preservation of the midblock theaters and the low-density character of the 42nd Street corridor
were always put forth as the justification for the enormous densities of the office towers and the
questionable inclusion of a wholesale mart on a historic entertainment street. The soundness of the policy
logic lacked planning substance, however. Despite evidence of studies completed, theater planning was
minimal, one knowing participant recalled. City and state officials were making decisions for the theaters
on the basis of generalized ideas and stylized facts from feasibility studies conducted between 1980 and
1981, when the theater business was relatively robust. As summarized in a 1984 report on the “Status and
Summary” of the Theater Preservation/Renovation Program, the 13-page “outline” fell far short of the
type of overall vision and concrete economic strategy needed to energize the implementation of such a
high-profile goal and historic theme for the street’s revitalization. It suggested that thought had been
given to regulatory issues of control—scale, prohibition of air-rights development, design, and use of the
renovated spaces—designed to ensure that the theaters’ preservation. Nevertheless, missing were the
detailed economics of how this “plan” would actually work. Indeed, the plan’s program implicitly
assumed that theater needed nothing more to stay alive in New York than a supply of adequate buildings
in which to mount productions.
Responsibility for the cost of acquiring the theaters had been structured into the deals with private
developers of the office, mart, and hotel sites, but these were capital subsidies for acquisition of the
existing structures. They would only carry the theater agenda through the first act of the redevelopment
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play. Act two, renovation, could proceed only with private funding from the theater’s designated
developers. While the deal for the office sites allowed $4.2 million of its $9.45 million theater
contribution to be used for the improvement and renovation of the five theaters packaged into Site 5 and
the deal for Site 7 likewise provided for a $750,000 contribution, these amounts were not intended to
cover the renovations but for property acquisition. More to the point, act three, theater operation, had to
be self-sustaining: The seven theaters slated for profit-making uses were expected to make it on the
strength of box-office revenues, helped along only by relatively low payments-in-lieu-of taxes (PILOTs)
in the deal approved by the BOE and favorable federal tax benefits for historic preservation. Where
operating funds were to come from for the Liberty and the Victory Theaters, required by the GPP to be
used only for “institutional” theater, was not dealt with at all.
The city’s deal makers understood the self-sustaining mandate for the theaters to be a risky
proposition. As an alternative for the Times Square Theater, the deal with Cambridge Investment Group
allowed the developer to use the space for retailing; similarly, in the case of the Empire and Liberty
Theaters (adjacent to the mart site on the south side of the street), some mart-related uses were permitted.
Renovation of the street’s crown-jewel, the Art-Deco New Amsterdam Theater—legendary even by the
rich Broadway standards of the time—seemed more certain than the others, as it was to be redeveloped
for legitimate theater independent of the project by the Nederlander Organization, the national’s largest
theater operator.11 But for the more historically significant of the two theaters intended for use by nonprofit organizations, the Victory, uncertainty prevailed: No concept/feasibility plan for renovation and
reuse had been prepared. Moreover, the earliest feasibility study commissioned by the city and UDC had
identified the Victory and Liberty Theaters for non-profit uses precisely because their physical
characteristics limited the potential box-office revenues and, thus, their use for Broadway theater. The
study called for subsidies to cover higher overhead necessary to book, manage, and raise funds for the
Victory and Liberty operations. “The total annual deficit for these two houses may well reach $1 million,
although as much as $500,000 of that might be offset by fund-raising,” the report concluded.
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“Alternatively, this requirement could be met by diverting a small portion of the property tax revenues
produced by the rest of the 42nd Street development apart from the ten theaters.”12 The deal for the
theaters did not provide for any operating subsidies, however.
The precariousness of the theater-preservation strategy was not veiled. Rather, hope seemed to
lie in by-the-by change, at least as presented in the official record. “Institutional operators have not yet
been identified for either the Victory or Liberty,” the FEIS reported. “UDC and the City are confident
that, as the project moves ahead, the necessary commitments of funds will be forthcoming with respect to
the renovation of the Victory and the non-profit operation of both the Victory and the Liberty.” The
fallback solution anticipated by the city’s planners was first-run movie or theater-related uses, “until such
renovation and theater operations become feasible.”13 In one of the last-minute compromises made prior
to the BOE hearing on the 42DP, the city addressed mounting criticism of its theater “plan” with an
announcement that a 14-person Theater Advisory Committee would be formed, according to a UDC
update on the project, “to advise on the programming and management of the non-profit theaters.”14 It
would take another three years, however, and the hiring of a dedicated urban planner, Rebecca Robertson,
for the 42DP to concentrate on how to meet its goals for the theater sites.
However persistent and strong the public sector’s symbolic rhetoric on preserving the theaters
was, it did not persuade the skeptics. At the public hearings, the incompleteness of the “plan” was called
to task by the Regional Plan Association with an appeal to the BOE to withhold approval until assurances
for the theaters and four other significant planning issues were forthcoming. The Actors’ Equity
Association and Save the Theaters, Inc., the city’s major theater preservation organization, jointly
withheld endorsement of the 42DP, firmly convinced after the demolition of the Helen Hayes and
Morosco Theaters that the city and its planners did not really understand the elements needed to maintain
the vitality of the theater district. They had lost both patience and belief that the city would ever do the
right thing for its underappreciated Broadway heritage. The promises to restore the 42nd Street movie
houses to their historical roles as legitimate playhouses were “too vague” to be judged, Jack L. Goldstein,
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director of Save the Theaters later wrote. “It is unclear whether funding for the theaters will be sufficient;
it is unclear how they will be operated. Instead of a cohesive plan for the sensible management of the
42nd Street corridor as an entertainment complex of mixed performing arts uses, the plan simply proposes
that some of the theaters be thrown into the competitive commercial market of Broadway.”15
Though the city’s goal was genuinely conceived, its initial execution was seriously flawed. It
was crippled by the narrowness of what theater preservation meant at the time—”live” Broadway-like
productions—and a policy decision that commercial use of the theaters should prevail over other ways to
preserve the structures. The financial imperative remained dominant even in this most politically
sensitive piece of the public agenda. Scenarios for reuse as film-revival houses or commercial-television
production facilities had been briefly considered by UDC and PDC’s consultants, who concluded that
such uses were “not necessarily commercially feasible.”16 If the theaters could be commercially operated,
there would be little need to spend scarce city resources to obtain the benefits their revitalization would
bring to the street—middle-class pedestrian activity, ongoing employment, restaurant trade and related
retail sales. Entertainment in the most general sense was not encouraged in the redevelopment plan,
though this would have been consistent with the cleanup strategy to put a new slate of “good” pedestriangenerating activities on the block in place the existing “bad” uses. “There seems never to have been a
recognition that forms of entertainment other than theater are also ‘legitimate,’” argued one architectural
critic in an insightful review of the redevelopment plan for Architectural Record in 1984. “The [design]
guidelines do not encourage movie theaters or nightclubs, rehearsal space, or stages for dance and music
(except Broadway musicals). These uses frequently cannot generate the revenues per square foot that
office or retail space can. They are, however, indispensable elements of what makes New York a center
for the arts.” The problem, he concluded, was the “giantism of the plan,” which was “at odds with the
idea of a coherent theater or entertainment district.”17 A more politically forthright assessment would
have concluded that the theater “plan” amounted only to compensatory symbolism.

13

The hollowness of the policy effort would further weaken an already fragile consensus for the
project. As revealed in the city and state’s deals for development, the priority of the 42DP was singularly
clear: commercial office development. The financial strategy of concentrating massive densities for
office towers on all sides of the symbolic center of Times Square defined the 42DP in terms that became
highly controversial, aesthetically as well as programmatically. In the absence of a substantive program
for the theater agenda, the city’s planning approach threatened the symbolic as well as physical character
of West 42nd Street. Reflecting the city’s zeal to clear away social problems, the corporate character of
the initial plan, exemplified by the design for four massive office towers dreamed up for George Klein,
the designated developer, by architects Philip Johnson and John Burgee, appeared arrogantly and brutally
insensitive to the cultural symbolism of the place.

An Object Lesson for Government
Intense concern over the fate of the former Times Tower signaled the opening round of the civics’ battle,
led by the Municipal Art Society (MAS), for the symbolic soul of Times Square. It was the harbinger of
high-profile politicized events to come, though this clash had nothing to do with aesthetic merit.
Architecturally mutilated in 1964 after the Times sold the building to Allied Chemical Corporation which
sought a “showcase for chemistry,” the $10-million facelift—hailed at the time in the business press as a
hopeful sign that the “decaying travesty” of “once-proud” Times Square was in for a change18—covered
the historic skyscraper with what Huxtable called “a no-style skin of lavatory white marble with the look
of cut cardboard.”19 The 25-story former limestone and terra-cotta building designed in ItalianRenaissance style by Cyrus L. W. Eidlitz remained, nonetheless, to the world at large, the Times Tower.
“It could probably be made of marzipan and it wouldn’t matter. The odd little icon is universally known
by the illuminated signs,” remarked Huxtable.20 Its evocative power was part illusion, yet its signs
assured an enduring iconic status just as its site, shape, and silhouette had definitely guaranteed its role as
the symbolic focus of Times Square when first erected 80 years earlier.
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Not long after the Johnson/Burgee designs debuted publicly, in a move designed to draw
widespread attention to the fate of the former Times Tower, the MAS and the Design Arts Program of the
National Endowment for the Arts co-sponsored an open, international design competition for the site.
The goal: “focus attention on imminent large-scale development in the area” and “reflect on the possible
meaning of this very special public space for the next generation.”21 It was a “no-build” competition, the
society explained, because the building—which no one seemed to reference any way other than by its
namesake—was in private hands. For a $45 fee, every entrant was given a kit with background
information and photographs; entries were to be judged on the basis of a single drawing, 30 by 40 inches.
Responses poured in, 565 of them from 1,380 individuals or teams registered in 17 states and 19
countries, many of whom were young designers seeking an opportunity for recognition in a blind judging.
The diverse entries, which included many buildings similar in shape to the original Times Tower
and one, its literal reconstruction, “all made clear the deep, almost passionate commitment of architects to
Times Square’s traditional, somewhat honky-tonk, identity,” wrote Times architecture critic Paul
Goldberger in a review.22 Consistent with that view, the entries also revealed a common distress with the
radical transformation of Times Square proposed by the Johnson/Burgee designs. A distinguished jury of
nine design professionals chaired by Henry N. Cobb, a partner of I. M. Pei & Partners and also at the time
chairman of the department of architecture at Harvard University, deliberated over two days. In the end
when it became apparent that no three entries had garnered sufficient support to justify the distinction
between “prize” and “commendation” as set forth in the competition guidelines, the jury decided not to
award a first-prize winner, but rather eight equal prizes of $2,250, one of them to a poem. Considered
from a professional perspective, the terms of the competition lacked an explicit program of action so it
was difficult to come to a clear decision on a winner. It was an “idea” competition. Under the leadership
of Cobb, the jury issued a public statement unanimously putting forth its judgment that the Times Tower
site stands at a “unique point of confluence” and should be occupied by a building. “It is not an
appropriate site for an open plaza or monument…the building on this site should respect and reinforce the
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street walls of Seventh Avenue and Broadway. In this respect it would be difficult to improve on the
wedge-shaped form of the present building.” The jury also stated that the building site should be “multiuse, and at least in part accessible to the public. It should include space devoted to those entertainment
and communications functions whose continued presence is crucial to the life of the district of which
Times Square is the vital center.”
Making a public statement was unusual for an architectural jury, though not for the MAS.
Indeed, creating public awareness through a PR-type event, even if it turned out to be something of a
polemic, was a tactic typical of the society. For planning and aesthetic issues of civic importance, the
society’s leaders aimed to create media awareness of the policy questions, to get out front of an issue and
present viable alternatives to the public at large and city officials in particular. The winning proposals
from the Times Tower site competition, like other events to follow, were exhibited at the society’s Urban
Center on Madison Avenue at 51st Street. The message: Leave the Times Tower site as it is, even if it is
dead.
Creating an open space void of aesthetic interferences that would set off his Rockefeller Centerlike ensemble of office towers was a Johnsonian idea. “It is not a distinguished building of any kind,”
said his partner Burgee, who reportedly added that the former Times Tower ought to be torn down
because it does not fit with Johnson’s plans.23 Klein agreed, although he did not have to disagree with
that assessment to understand that it was politically necessary to present an alternative centerpiece for the
site. Toward that end he retained architects Venturi, Rauch & Scott Brown of Philadelphia as consultants.
Asked to design an element for the site that would be in keeping with Times Square’s popular references
and commercial vitality and that at the same time would be consistent with the scale of the proposed
towers to surround it, the principals brought to the task a unique architectural understanding of
contemporary American popular culture. Constrained by having to work with Johnson and Burgee’s
designs as a given, they nonetheless kept to their own signature definition of architecture. With their
colleagues, Robert Venturi and John Rauch quickly produced a series of daring iconographic images
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based on the general idea of a “Big Apple for Times Square,” which they described as “a piece of
representational sculpture which is bold in form yet rich in symbolism, realism with a diversity of
associations. It is popular and esoteric...stark in its simplicity and monumental in scale….This 90 ft.-plus
diameter apple is the modern equivalent of the Baroque obelisk that identifies the center of a plaza.”24
Times Square is “exceedingly important, if not the most important space in the city—wonderfully
exceptional where the diagonal hits the grid,” Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown later explained in
an interview.25 They wanted to put something there—in the center of Manhattan—that would be as
symbolic and imageful to New York as the Statute of Liberty at the island’s edge. They wanted it to be
civic in character, memorable. The big apple small in the context of such huge towers, the bright-red
glossy surface, the simple silhouette, all these elements reflected their well-studied view that contrasts in
scale and unusual juxtapositions “are traditional means of creating surprise, tension and richness in urban
architecture.” Just as it signified Venturi’s love of double meaning, the preliminary design was at the
same time a “spoofing” of Johnson. The first but not the last of their brilliant if sometimes jarring visions
for New York, the “Big Apple” was rejected by Klein.
Fellow architects and critics reacted with no more affection, however much some respected
Venturi’s courage to tread where others did not even dare while others misunderstood his brilliant
architectural wit. In an appraisal of remaining design problems in the Johnson/Burgee scheme,
Goldberger caught the architect’s intent—“The Venturi plan is shocking, difficult to accept at first—and
brilliant...the genius in this work lies in its ability to manipulate proportion and the element of surprise in
such a way as to make us think of the apple as a monumental object, not as a common piece of fruit”—but
then Goldberger saw no reason to save the ghost of what was once an “eccentric” landmark.26
Venturi’s Big Apple was brilliant, but “alien.” As expressed in the ideals and entries of the MAS
competition, the opinions voiced at the BOE hearings and on the pages of the Times, New Yorkers did not
want iconography for Times Square, or more specifically, they did not want a new icon. They simply
wanted the former Times Tower preserved, whatever the state of its aestheticism, because it was an icon
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of the city. As John J. Costonis defined the concept in his cogently argued book about preservation, Icons
and Aliens, the former Times Tower was an icon because it was “invested with values that confirm our
sense of order and identity.”27 It represented the symbolic environment of Times Square, physically. Its
embedded associations—as a public place of breaking news announcements, as a civic place of
celebration and of protest, as a center of unrestrained commercialism—had made it so. The former Times
Tower was synonymous with the “zipper,” the ball drop on New Year’s Eve, big billboards, and blinking
electric signs. Venturi’s playful and ironic Big Apple may have been less alien than Johnson and
Burgee’s awesomely corporate towers, but in the political context of the times, only relatively so. Both
threatened the icon and hence, New Yorkers’ “investment in the icon’s values.” At a time of
uncomprehended change, actual and proposed—a description fitting midtown Manhattan during the
1980s’ building boom—the bonds between people and icons, Costonis wrote eloquently, become
especially compelling. In the face of environmental changes perceived to be a threat to social values, the
call for preservation becomes a symbolic call for reassurance and psychological stability, not an aesthetic
brief based on notions of beauty. Nowhere was this more so than in Times Square.
Only George Klein, his architects and the project’s most ardent public supporters saw the need for
a “centerpiece” for a new Times Square. Using the language of design, the two different sets of architects
set out criteria for evaluating what was appropriate for the dense concentration of office towers. The
Venturi proposal was the most controversial put forth by the developer, but not the only one. A proposal
for a seven-story, Italianate-style bell tower by Johnson and Burgee quietly circulated around New York
about two years later, and before that the two partners’ more reasonable scheme to strip the old Times
Tower down to its steel skeleton, paint it white and use it as a base for searchlights. The skeleton, in fact,
has been the icon’s most enduring architectural feature. When built, the Times Tower was notable chiefly
for its “progressively engineered steel frame and its pedantically designed details.”28 Stripping away
those details had done nothing to diminish the tower’s appeal as a place to make a statement. In 1968, for
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example, the artists Christo and Jeanne-Claude, known for their wrapping of civic monuments, focused
their intentions on Allied Chemical’s “Flat Iron” tower, but to no avail.29
In the mid-1980s, among the architects, planners, historians, and other experts opposed to any
kind of radical alteration, no discussion of an appropriate “centerpiece” was really necessary. The ghost
was sufficiently evocative. Not unexpectedly given the symbolic importance of the tower, city and state
officials could come to no agreement on an alternative idea for the site. Having learned their lesson,
somewhat reluctantly, they gave in to the status quo—though not before the leases with TSCA had been
signed in summer 1988.

Reframing the Issue
Ominously, the Johnson/Burgee designs for the 42DP towers threatened to become a model for the entire
district’s reconstruction. As the MAS and other civic groups viewed the situation, at stake was nothing
less than the permanent scale of the neighborhood, and the diverse character of its commercial uses and
entertainment activities; these were economically fragile enterprises which could not afford the high rents
in new buildings and would not survive a relocation. Because it feared a “Williamsburg, Virginia type of
preservation,” recalled architect and MAS director Paul Byard, the 45-member board30 considered it very
important to save the low-rent space in structures like the Brill Building. As the early headquarters for
America’s popular music industry, the Brill Building, built in 1931, held symbolic significance; it was, as
one historian noted, “a building that had a warren of small gyms and the offices of fight promoters and
commission agents, in addition to demonstration rooms for vocalists, songwriters, pluggers, and
others....”31 A hollow prospect haunted the MAS board: “The future may be preserved theaters with
nothing around them to support them in a cultural sense, and our theater district could become a kind of
Houston.”32
When the detailed fabric of daily commerce was examined through this refracted lens of
awareness, the MAS discovered another dimension of the district beyond the Broadway theater industry:
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the bars of Eighth Avenue thriving with middle-class black patrons, the lunchtime-frequented boxing
clubs, the dwindling pool rooms, and the ubiquitous movie theaters with first runs catering to low-income
customers from all five boroughs, the family-owned businesses and restaurants like the Grand
Luncheonette—which grabbed its moment of national fame in Taxi Driver (1976)—whose longevity in
Times Square made them neighborhood fixtures. Under the dedicated joint leadership of architect Hugh
Hardy and landscape architect Nicholas Quennell, the MAS formed an Entertainment District Committee
to spearhead the organization’s new agenda for Times Square—to protect the “bowl of light” created by
the low-density buildings which made up the bow-tie; to preserve the visual, glitz character of its
commercial billboards and electronic signs; and to secure landmark status for its legitimate theaters. The
group worked “feverishly” to make progress on what the society’s board minutes noted as “the three s’s:
Size, Shape and Signage,” while struggling with the larger issue of zoning. The committee was
convinced, Hardy reported to the MAS board, “that if we clean up Times Square by tearing it all down
and replacing it with office towers, we will be doing the wrong thing by eliminating the area’s
diversity.”33 A few months later, Hardy passionately reiterated the MAS’ mission:34
Times Square is overutilized and underappreciated…We [the Entertainment District
Committee] have begun to counter the argument that you have to abolish Times Square in
order to clean it up. We have become effective in persuading people that if business
continues as usual, Times Square will disappear. We are making it clear that we are not
opposed to all development. We will address the issue of density, how much and where.
The shaping of bulk is a primary consideration. In this regard, the Portman Hotel
(Marriott Marquis) has proved to be a helpful ally by being an example of what not to do.
We will attempt to propose a way to approach our goals through taxation and zoning
rules and regulations, and we will continue to promote our views zealously. We will
have to identify the coalition that will then go and do our work. We have to convince
interested parties that they will have to cooperate or lose the neighborhood.
First and foremost, it was Hardy, principal of Hardy Holzman Pfeiffer Associates, who
championed the Times Square “character” issue within the MAS. While others fixed on the physical
environment of the district or the cultural significance of the theaters, for him, the cause was all about
promoting public culture, theater in particular. “I though people were missing a lot of what made Times
Square the vibrant, diverse area is was: the breadth of activity and popular culture that the district
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attracted.” The ancillary activities—voice trainers, instrument suppliers, prop and costume makers,
lighting specialists, makeup and set artists, booking agents, talent brokers, publicists—that support the
theater have always been important, he stressed in an interview, to defining the character of the Theater
District.35 Little of this might actually get preserved, but this image was another form of romanticism
about Times Square.36
Hardy and his fellow MAS board members, in particular Philip Howard and Kent Barwick with
staff member Darlene McCloud, set out to change the public consciousness about Times Square. To
convince an unknowing and skeptical public that the lights, glitter, and tawdry character were worth
preserving, Barwick staged PR stunts, developed effective pamphlet literature, and deployed
organizational tactics designed to make the “character” issue a cause celebre. The board focused the
staff’s efforts on what it believed to be the greatest strength of the organization, coalition building, since
“The Society, operating by itself, cannot possible make any difference: our power comes from being able
to spur action.”37 First, as discussed earlier, it sponsored an international competition for the former
Times Tower site in March of 1984, which “worked,” Barwick said, “because it was a prolonged public
relations device. It got people talking and asking questions.”38

To attract an even bigger audience likely

to be sympathetic to the cause, Barwick teamed up with Tama Starr, the third-generation head of her
family’s Artkraft Strauss Sign Corporation, which had built most of the famous Times Square signs, and
other civics. On Saturday evening the weekend before the first set of public hearings on the 42DP, they
staged a half-hour blackout of all signs at 7:30 P.M. The idea was to surprise and stun the thousands of
theatergoers bustling through Times Square on the way to their 8:00 P.M. curtains, thereby dramatizing
the importance of signage and bright lights in Times Square—what would be lost in a corporatedominated redevelopment plan. For maximum effect, they turned off all the signs, one by one, at twosecond intervals, so the television cameras could pan the spreading darkness from south to north. The one
sign deliberated left lit, the 20-foot-high-by-40-foot-wide Spectacolor display on the former Times Tower
flashed the message: “HEY, MR. MAYOR! IT’S DARK OUT HERE! HELP KEEP THE BRIGHT
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LIGHTS IN TIMES SQUARE!” The hugely effective attention-getting event—nothing like it had
happened since World War II—was repeated in November, on the eve of the BOE’s final deliberation of
the 42DP.39
The next move may have been one of Hardy’s most inspired ideas to dramatize the case. In the
summer of 1985 before the City Planning Commission (CPC) hearings on new planning controls for the
Theater District scheduled for September, he enlisted the aid of Peter Bosselman and his Simulation
Laboratory, or Sim Lab, to depict what would happen if the Theater District was fully developed under
existing zoning. Sim Lab’s task was to suggest an image of what might be possible in Times Square
under Hardy’s “ideal world” of “revised zoning controls and stronger signage and set back requirements.”
Bosselman, director of the Environmental Simulation Laboratory in Berkeley, California had developed
Sim Lab with a grant from the National Science Foundation to provide a realistic “experience” of what a
project would really look like before it was built by moving through a three-dimensional model, and had
tested it out with a simulation of San Francisco’s proposed Downtown Plan. The model was judged to be
very influential, Hardy and others argued, because it had been helped citizens and civic decision makers
understand the consequences of the rezoning proposal. The effect in San Francisco, one member
explained, was one of horror at the impact on downtown. By applying the same simulation techniques to
Times Square, the MAS aimed to tell the city that they “didn’t want Sixth Avenue from river to river.”40
Bosselman developed a 16-foot miniature model of every building along Seventh Avenue and
Broadway between 42nd and 53rd Streets, including signs, billboards, cars, people, statues, and trees
around the ticket booths on Duffy Square, which was capable of portraying three worlds of Times
Square—existing, fully built out, and ideal. Accompanying the model was a 12-minute film narrated by
Jason Robards showing each development scenario of Times Square from a pedestrian’s viewpoint. The
impact of the model, first shown publicly at the CPC hearings—with the cast of Big River for liveentertainment backup—was immediate and riveting. “The dramatic change in scale dazzled the eyes of
designers, planners, and nonprofessionals alike,” Bosselman wrote later.41 Apparently fascinated by the
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model’s vivid impression of the neighborhood and the alternative transformations that awaited it, the
commissioners subsequently came to speak of Times Square as an “Entertainment District.” Though
admittedly modest, this acknowledgment of the neighborhood’s unique role in New York marked the
MAS’ first tangible triumph. The change in language in official circles, Barwick noted in a mood of selfcongratulation at a board meeting, was what changed the argument.42 In the terms Donald A. Schön used
to describe The Reflective Practitioner, it reframed the issue.
After viewing the model, an impressed Paul Goldberger led off his architectural review in the
Times with the provocative title, “Will Times Square Become a Grand Canyon?” In this article,
Goldberger attacked the city’s zoning incentives and policies:43
The light, the energy, the sense of contained chaos that have long characterized Times
Square are essentially incompatible with high-rise office buildings, or with stark and
harsh modern hotel towers like the Marriott. It has been clear since the first of these
towers went up in this part of town more than 15 years ago: these buildings do not fit.
They do not reflect the character of Times Square and the theater district; they squash it,
as firmly as a shoe might flatten an ant.
The Times Square Sim Lab model was a stunning success. Astutely, Hardy and his committee
and Barwick had reasoned through how best to use the model, how its message would be received, and
what impact it could have on the policy debate. The group wanted to show a lot of affordable signage, the
necessity of the ‘bowl of light”—air space and a view of the sky. It had gone back in time to study the
1916 Zoning Ordinance, which had been developed with light and air as guiding principles. But as one
director remarked, “It doesn’t do much good to tell someone who is 25 years old that the 1916 zoning was
better. Millions of square feet of typists makes theater-related uses impossible.”44 The model proved to
be tactically important because it could convey the significance of FAR in lay terms, without depending
upon the use of abstract concepts. The MAS leaders used it to take a positive position of what should be
there rather than coming out with negative messages about FAR targeting developers, which, Byard
stressed at one meeting, from a political perspective, would more likely be perceived as an impossible
posture by city policy makers and politicians. From the start they saw the Sim-Lab model as a device
around which a strong PR campaign could be mounted, and they craftily used the model to promote the
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Society’s ideal vision with a choreographed plan of heavy press and media coverage and presentations of
the model and the film to the theater unions, all of their professional associates and the city’s other civic
organizations. “If you are opening an exhibit on Times Square in the middle of August,” advised
Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, who was among those who early on believed that the proposed plan for the
42DP would sterilize Times Square, “and you hope to change the results of anything, it would be wise to
plan on generating a barrage of publicity.”45
Other PR events followed: the inaugural of the new Cannon sign with its three miles of neon
(November 1985); a Times op-ed titled “Times Square’s Last Rites” (June 1986) by Philip K. Howard,
long-time active MAS director and corporate lawyer who was later elected chairman of the society;
creation of the Broadway-star-studded “Committee to Keep Times Square Alive” to support the cause and
raise voices at public hearings. One such event, a press conference, occurred on the front steps of City
Hall the day the BOE met to vote on the new design rules mandating signs, lights, and setbacks in Times
Square, which the MAS had worked so hard and diligently to birth (January 1987). There were
exhibitions on Times Square at the society’s Urban Center headquarters on Madison Avenue at 51st
Street46 and a presentation of a Certificate of Merit to Artkraft Strauss (June 1987) “For delighting
millions over many decades with extravagant sign displays that wrap Times Square in ribbons of light and
color, and for bringing glamour and glitter to the nation’s New Year’s Eve for the past eighty years by
dropping the lighted ball on top of the Times Tower.”47
All of these events were opportunities for the MAS to get its message across, to educate the
public as to what the organization was trying to do, which though not inconsistent with the discarded
Cooper-Eckstut design guidelines for the 42DP, was diametrically opposed to the city’s current program
for the project. Even after the new Times Square design regulations had been legislated into law in
February 1987, Barwick pointed out the necessity of continued vigilance. Not only did he feel that
developers might try to elude the legislation, the work was far from done: two other key items on the
city’s planning agenda for Times Square—rezoning and landmark designations—were still to be debated
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and decided later that year. The MAS needed to mobilize its constituency, get out in front of its issue,
and stay there. It would be the “Passionate Minority,” to borrow a term from Anthony Downs.
If the issue of signage struck a dissonant chord with the aesthetic legacy of the MAS, protecting
the physical and cultural character of a prized city neighborhood, even Times Square, fit squarely within
its organizational mandate to preserve the best attributes of the city’s civic appearance, especially after the
city passed a Landmarks Preservation Law in 1965. Since the 1950s the MAS had seen its role as
erecting a scholarly foundation for the preservation movement; its record of activism in the early days of
that movement when lots of glorious buildings in New York fell victim to the wreckers ball was mixed.
The genesis and character of the society imparted a conservative bent which worked against aggressive
advocacy, so its support in several key cases turned out to be belated, sometimes too late. Also, the need
to avoid outright controversy within the boardroom lest it cause a split within its own ranks, as was the
case in the society’s reluctance to come out against the 42DP before the BOE in 1984, could lead to
waffling. In short, the MAS was not always a forerunner in high-profile land-use controversies. But as
the campaign to save the character of Times Square revealed, slow entry into the fray did not diminish its
ultimate impact.

Forging a New Political Consensus
A good-time place that belongs to everybody: democratic, freewheeling, hedonistic. A mix of high and
low culture, theater, popular entertainment. An experience for consumers, tourists, families. An aesthetic
cacophony of contradictory styles, scales and materials, honky-tonk diversity. Brash bold signage and
glitz, unabashedly commercial. Crossroads of the World, an international trademark, an instantly
recognizable brand.
These were the set pieces for rescripting the redevelopment of West 42nd Street. The belated
task began in earnest in mid-1991, went public in concept in the fall of 1992, then formally debuted in
detail a year later. Defined first as “interim,” 42nd Street Now! put forth a dramatically different plan of
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programmed uses calibrated to restore “New York’s quintessential entertainment district”—without
conceding an inch of ground over the office towers that would “continue to be a major part of the longterm redevelopment.” “The focus of the renewed 42nd Street will be theaters and all that goes with them:
restaurants and retail establishments related to entertainment and tourism. Once again 42nd Street will be
able to take its rightful place among the world’s great urban entertainment destinations.”48 In concept,
visual imagery, and language, the plan revealed a shift in values so clear and so starling that a certain
level of disbelief and cautious skepticism accompanied the general enthusiasm with which it was greeted.
After rumors of The Walt Disney Company’s interest in restoring The New Amsterdam Theater as its
New York venue for legitimate theater solidified into a hard financial commitment affirming the new
entertainment focus for West 42nd Street, a cartoon by Arnoldo Franchioni in the New Yorker titled
“Fantasy: The New Forty-Second Street?” captured the inescapable irony of such an improbable
transformation of planning values.
When the idea of a new “interim” plan for 42nd Street was announced to the public in August
1992, simultaneous with the formal collapse of the old plan, the editors of the Times called the city and
state’s decision to suspend construction of the four office towers “A New Opening for Times Square.”
Those at Newsday saw it as “an unexpected benefit from the city’s economic doldrums, a “Glad Reprieve
for Times Square.” At Crain’s, editors advised, “Times Sq. Revival should center on consumer uses.”
The “opportunity—for faster restoration of the street-level hurly-burly and empty theaters” and the
benefit of a revitalized street “in a manner more in keeping with its ebullient history” came with caveats:
“An interim approach is hardly ideal. Why struggle to revitalize 42nd Street only to tear it down later?”
It also came with costs: the developers were “relieved of the immediate cost of renovating the sprawling
Times Square subway interchange.” Relief that the planned towers would not go forward, as designed,
was palpable, as was the hope that the alternative plan would hold a silver lining. Newsday’s editors were
prescient: “there’s a good chance that if the entertainment center proves successful, it could influence the
design—and aesthetic integration into Times Square—of any office towers that are ultimately built.”49
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Any type of consensus on the 42DP was rare because the credibility of public action on this
project had long since disappeared. “We had become a pariah, politically,” Robertson recalled.50 Even
those with objections to individual pieces of the new plan applauded the whole new vision as a sign that a
future existed for West 42nd Street. The city and state’s real task now was to get from the present empty,
desolate street to the new vision of West 42nd Street as a place of lights! signs! dancing! It was “post-nobills” territory. Something needed to happen, fast. While the formal, more detailed vision was in the
process of being worked out, it was “urgent,” said the Times “that the emptiness be refilled.”
Both sides knew that they could not leave the project where it was, boarded up. TSCA, according
to George Klein, first recognized this. Carl Weisbrod, the project’s earliest visible leader and Robertson’s
predecessor, said the idea was definitely hers. It was, she said, something of an epiphany: “The Gap
opened a store at the corner of 42nd Street and Seventh Avenue in the spring of 1992, and they did it all
on their own.” “It was a pivotal moment. Our retail guys said their numbers were incredible, and
suddenly we realized what was possible here.”51 The bill would be paid by TSCA under the terms of the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the 42DP and the developer in which TSCA finally
agreed to spend a minimum of $20 million to fill these empty spaces in adherence with design guidelines
being established as part of the new plan. “The quid pro quo for not having to build is that your have to
bring 42nd Street back to life,” said Robertson.52
The “interim” goal of 42nd Street Now! was to establish tourist and entertainment-related shops
and other “lively late-night venues”—a music store with video theater, nightclubs, restaurants, a ticket
agent, even a currency-exchange service center—in the existing buildings where the towers were to rise,
some day. It was a temporary antiblight plan to attract pedestrian activity to the storefronts left vacant
from the condemnation; the expectation was that the stores would remain in place for seven to 15 years.
For the longer-term “full-build program,” in the jargon of the Supplemental EIS, the rescripted plan
presented three revised priorities: an expanded program of entertainment uses for the midblock theater
sites under the 42DP’s control; exacting design, use and operating (DUO) guidelines to assure visual
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drama through razzle-dazzle lights and signage; and a commitment of public rather than private funds to
complete condemnation of the project area’s western end—which remained essential to cleanse the street
of pornography.
The ideas that gave rise to these priorities came from several sources. These included the public
debates and intensive studies of the entertainment district which led up to the 1987 design guidelines for
and 1988 rezoning of Times Square and the 44 diverse and creative proposals for reuse of the historic
theaters and the role-defining deliberations of the 42EC, renamed the New 42nd Street, Inc. (New42). At
the same time, developer Douglas Durst put forth an “antiplan” plan of entertainments for eight historic
theaters on the street, which his family controlled for a brief period.53 Robertson’s task was to meld the
many ideas (crazy, out-of-the box, traditional), studies and reports (theater preservation, visual aesthetics,
zoning, financial feasibility, retail development feasibility), and creative thrusts into a feasible plan, then
aggressively market the vision and shepherd the plan through various approvals to ensure that would
assure its implementation. Asked about the parallels with the project opponents’ proposals for a touristbased entertainment center, she once replied: “You know what? Every good idea has it time. The fact of
the matter is that this is a good idea, even if we were not necessarily the authors of it.”54
The goal of the design-driven conceptual plan was to recreate the street’s legendary luster, with
razzle-dazzle honky-tonk details. The images and ideas in their visuals represent a look backward, with
modifications for technology and activity options geared to current consumer tastes for pleasure and
entertainment. It was nostalgia elevated by state-of-the-art marketing.
It would take more than two years to line up all the pieces before Robertson could orchestrate the
formal presentation of 42nd Street Now! in September 1993. For earlier changes to the program requiring
amendments to the GPP, an Environment Assessment had been sufficient, procedurally. But the scope
and direction of change embedded in the new plan finally put it over the top; UDC would have to
completely redo the EIS, a time-intensive and costly—approximately $1.6 million—task as necessary
politically as procedurally. Not unexpectedly, the new entertainment and tourist-oriented agenda of the
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plan garnered strong support from the performing-arts community, once their greatest fear—competition
from additional legitimate-theater entertainment—had been assuaged.55 This group, in alignment with
architects and design professionals, turned out in force for the public hearings, more so than for the
previous events. Together, they grabbed the most microphone time, 17 spots of the total 53 who testified.
No other set of interests even came close; the closest were the property owners and tenants of West 42nd
Street, nine in number. Those representing the arts and culture spoke in highly positive terms about the
new plan—though the producers were against subsidies to Disney. Five major issues about the proposed
changes to the GPP dominated the testimony: broadening the uses for the midblock theaters, especially
the return of movies to the street; traffic and transportation impacts; procedures for the plan’s approval;
the financial arrangements with developers and questionable need for subsidies, now; and, lastly, social
and street conditions—continuing concern about possible displacement of sex-businesses and crime to
nearby Clinton and Chelsea neighborhoods.
The response to the interim plan was overwhelmingly favorable: “beneficial,” “great and
brilliant,” “will break deadlock on the project plan,” “realistic look at the area and heads project in right
direction,” “generally sound,” “worth doing,” “laudable,” “imperative now.” Though some voices of
dissent could be heard, the overall tone of the hearings was relatively mild compared to past events, as
was the overall turnout.
The intense clash of values so dominant in earlier public forums was absent from these hearings,
though disappear totally it did not. Many New Yorkers continued to voice dislike of the idea of inventing
a new Times Square, preferring the place as it was: gritty and sinful, a spectacle characterized by unusual
street life. This came out most forcefully in set of opinions invited by the Times and printed on its op-ed
page. Luc Sante, the author of Low Life: Lures and Snares of Old New York, cleverly parodied the idea of
recapturing “that eccentric Times Square dazzlement” when he spoke of the requirement for “colorful
characters” and “spontaneous public spectacle.” The well-respected and insightful architectural critic for
The Boston Globe, Robert Campbell, summed up the character of New York, as revealed by Times
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Square as the city “of the risk of the unknown, and so the turf of the inside dopester, the urban sleuth, the
holder of private knowledge. Let Times Square remain so. Let it be always the home of entertainment,
but never turned insider out to become, itself, a presented entertainment.” And in a sarcastic plea, Susan
Orlean, a New Yorker staff writer and author of Saturday Night called for the old diversity. “If a peddler
on Broadway is selling fake cellular telephone, shouldn’t others nearby be encouraged with tax
abatements to offer, say, wind-up chattering teeth or those weird neon tubes?” 56
Just as the new plan no longer fought with the street’s historic identity, the city and state’s
commitment to the original high-density office program remained solidly in place. In the minds of many,
42nd Street Now! was enticing but unfortunately interim. The editors of Newsday advised public officials
“Better rethink those office towers.” The project was “out of synch with market reality,” they wrote: “the
public had swallowed the idea of four bulky towers...with great difficulty. What made the idea of these
monstrosities somewhat palatable were the public benefits dangled before New Yorkers. Like a brand
new mezzanine for the dilapidated 42nd Street subway station...” but this was “kissed goodbye” back in
1992. “Redeveloping Times Square is still a worthy venture,” they concluded, “but what seemed feasible
in 1982 may be obsolete....Fifty-story boxes never did cut it in Times Square.”57 Long-time critics of the
42DP such as Senator Franz Leichter and the MAS were quick to forcefully reiterate their objections to a
“massive give-away [that] will be New York City’s largest taxpayer-financed real estate boondoggle
ever,” “unbelievably large subsidies...that never made sense for the site, and are even worse now.”58
Veteran Times reporter Thomas J. Lueck questioned, “Must Show Go On?”59
These criticisms of the city’s financial deal with TSCA held even less political weight in the new
deal climate than they had in the past. This despite the fact that they arose under the Dinkins
Administration, which was less friendly to real estate development than the Koch Administration had
been. The city could not afford, as the business bi-weekly Crain’s put it, “angering the company that had
invested almost $300 million in the project,” nor to lose the 5,000 jobs its subsidiary, Prudential
Securities, Inc., had in New York, which “not coincidentally,” as Newsday pointed out, were in jeopardy.
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The reason was simple: The city and state needed Prudential and its deep pockets to fund the antiblight
interim plan and shield the public sector from possible further failure. Although they were in a position to
default the insurance giant, “A default doesn’t do us any good,” said Vincent Tese, chairman of UDC.60
If as an entertainment venue West 42nd Street today comes off as being too intensely
conventional—a nostalgia-oriented place packed with 38 movie screens, a wax museum, four Broadway
theaters, and lots of restaurants and retail activity centers but missing the type of technologically
advanced entertainments representative of the 21st century—the problem stems from the political
exigencies of the rescripted plan, 42nd Street Now! Driven by an immediate need to bring forth a new
vision for the street after the project had collapsed along with the market for commercial development,
the plan relied almost exclusively on visual aesthetics, in contrast to outlining a provocative program for
innovative content. It was part of a process geared to rebuilding political support for the controversial
project through new but comfortably safe images evocative of Times Square’s symbolic legacy, carefully
and professionally supported by intensely detailed design guidelines. As a political document, the new
vision aimed to heal controversy, rebuild anew a coalition of support, and market a set of hopes that, at
the time, seemed almost improbable. In other words, the plan was not a content-driven call for innovative
programming that aimed to cultivate way-out, cutting-edge entertainments, though Robertson and her
colleagues probably would have welcomed such uses. Rather, the visual razzle dazzle of the images
sought to assure key decision makers in government and business and, most importantly, the civics, that
the 42DP was now firmly aligned with the historic symbolism of Times Square. Ironically, therein lay its
limitation.
As much as 42nd Street Now! guaranteed that public officials would be ready to proceed when
the market recovered, in hindsight, the entertainment array on the new 42nd Street—relative to
technologically empowered entertainment showing elsewhere, at the animated Bellevue Studios in the
Music Box at Berlin’s Sony Center, for example—represents the status quo. In that sense, it represents a
nostalgic redo in new dress. Without diminishing the significance of the project’s achievement, in light of
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the possibility for exciting avant-guard fare, the programmatic build-out of West 42nd Street represents
something of a missed opportunity.
The symbolic and social meaning of Times Square could mobilize powerful imagery. When
deployed skillfully, it could fashion public opinion and spotlight planning issues of particular importance
to special interests. As a tactic of opposition, however, symbolism could not protect First-Amendment
rights, challenge eminent-domain takings, pose substantive questions about environmental impacts, inject
procedural delays on a continual basis, or threaten the economic feasibility of the 42DP. In short, it was
not a useful tool for those who sought to block the project completely—through litigation. Nor could
symbolism reveal the underlying economic dynamic of the public sector’s deals with private developers
or address other hard questions of public policy. Without these, symbolic politics ruled the debate over
Times Square’s future. Politically effective in shaping the dialogue, it was nevertheless limited. That
argument is, however, part of the bigger story of the transformation of West 42nd Street and Times
Square.

*

*

*

*

As an icon of city life, Times Square represents a symbolism that heralds change as a core
identity. That core identity is not frozen in any one frame—neither the roof gardens and nightlife
habitués characteristic of West 42nd Street pre-Prohibition, nor the 1930s romantic legend of Broadway,
nor the public place of the 1940s where people gathered to listen to the ballgame or wait for war news,
nor the 1950s playground of military shore leaves, nor the fleshpots and drug bazaar of the 1960s and
1970s, neither the Black and Latino teenage chill place of the 1980s, nor the last gasp of adult
entertainment still present on the edges of the district in the 1990s—it is all these things and more
arranged in some time-blurred montage of symbolic imagery. The cultural identities have been so fused
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together in the meaning of Times Square that the sheer inclusiveness of the place represents a trip across
demographic groups, income and status, and race.
The new Times Square remains synonymous with the city itself, its commercialism, intense
energy, urban insouciance, and cultural and economic diversity. The five meanings that over time
fashioned the symbolism of place of Times Square for New Yorkers and the world at large—Theater
District, Turf of Promoters and Showmen, Great White Way, Testing Ground, Quintessential New
York—are still in tack, with some modifications and one exception. In place of the larger-than-life
entrepreneurial impresarios—Hammerstein, Ziegfeld, Klaw and Erlanger, Thompson—the Turf of
Promoters and Showmen is now home the world’s giant entertainment conglomerates—Disney, SFX
Entertainment—who have brought a corporate approach to theater production at the same time that 42nd
Street’s other theater marquees have been renamed—the Ford Center for the Performing Arts and the
American Airlines Theater. If the commercial aesthetic has found new and highly expensive forms of
expression once again relighting Times Square, the place has lost its edge as a social testing ground, for
now. As is so evident in the hyperbole and the record-breaking numbers of tourists, Times Square
continues to embody the quintessential city image for the nation at large. A number of broad economic
and social forces are contributing to New York’s renewed position as the “Shrine of the Good Time” and
its glow as a “spectacle of urban life.” As in past, Times Square takes up its historic role by serving as the
symbolic metaphor. As an enduring stage for city life, the transformed Times Square presents itself as a
work in perpetual progress.
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